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ABSTRACT

Tabatabaei Ghomi, Hamed. M.A., Purdue University, December 2015. Restricted
Internalist Reliabilism. Major Professor: Matthias Steup.

I this paper, I introduce an internalist theory of justification which I call restricted
internalist reliabilism. The main concern of the theory is to explain when a belief source,
particularly perceptual experiences, can be a source of justification. I will discuss three
alternative internalist theories: dogmatism, conservatism and internalist reliabilism and
discuss objections and difficulties associated with each. I will then argue how restricted
internalist reliabilism can address many of those objections. Also I present the response
that each of these theories provide against the skeptic and argue for superiority of
restricted internalist reliabilism’s response compared to the other three theories.

1

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

My main goal in this paper is to argue for an internalist theory that explains why and how
a belief source in general, and perceptual experiences in particular provide justification. I
call that theory “restricted internalist reliabilism”. Theories such as the one presented in
this paper help us differentiate the justified beliefs from the unjustified ones and also, not
less importantly, provide responses to skepticism.
To argue for restricted internalist reliabilism, I analyze three major alternative
theories. I start with the simplest one, dogmatism, and from there I move on to
conservatism. I discuss problems of dogmatism and conservatism and show why we need
the next theory: internalist reliabilism. Then I discuss the problems of internalist
reliabilism and argue for taking the next step to restricted internalist reliabilism. The rest
of the paper is dedicated to restricted internalist reliabilism. I show how the theory is able
to solve some problems for which internalist reliabilism and other previously mentioned
theories have no good answer.
Before I start, let me make a few clarifications. I have chosen an internalist
approach in this paper and take knowledge to be un-Gettiered true belief that is justified
from the subject’s internal perspective. The locution “having justification for a belief” is
intended to mean “having reasons or evidence for that belief”. By justification, I always
mean prima facie justification unless stated otherwise. This means that justification can
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always be defeated by further evidence. Also I should note that the perceptual
experiences discussed in this paper all have assertive content i.e. they all represent the
world in a certain way. Perceptions, however, are not limited to those with assertive
content. There are other perceptions such as imagination which do not represent the
world in a certain way. I am not concerned with those perceptions in this paper.
As said above, one important goal of theories like the one presented in this paper
is to offer a response to skepticism. So let me also talk a little bit about skepticism and
the approaches that reject it. Skepticism is not the claim that perceptual beliefs are false;
they may be true or false. Skepticism merely claims that we cannot have justification for
perceptual beliefs. The skeptical argument for this claim has been formulated in many
ways. Let us consider one common simple formulation:
1- If I have justification to believe I have hands, I have justification to believe
that I am not a brain in a vat.
2- I do not have justification to believe that I am not a brain in a vat.
3- Therefore, I do not have justification to believe I have hands.
Substituting “J” for “having justification”, “B” for believing and “BIV” for “being
a brain in a vat” the above formulation can be abbreviated as follows:
1- J(hands)  J(~BIV)
2- ~J(~BIV)
3- ~J(hands)
Throughout this paper, I will refer to above formulation as the skeptical argument.
There are many variations of the above simple formulation, but at their core those
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variations generally have the following pattern: To have justification for proposition A,
we should antecedently have justification for proposition B. To have justification for B,
we should have antecedent justification for A. Therefore, we neither can have
justification for A, nor can we have justification for B (Pryor, 2000).
Philosophers have attacked skepticism from different angles. For example,
Descartes whose evil demon is the main antagonist of the skeptical play, rejects
skepticism by referring to God. He argues that we have non-perceptual reasons to believe
in God, and He would not give us unreliable senses and would not allow a demon to
constantly deceive us (or equally put our brain in a vat). Therefore, we non-perceptually
know that we are not being deceived by an evil demon. Others have rejected skepticism
by claiming a rational presumption that our senses are reliable or claiming that it is a
priori unlikely that coherent experiences like our perceptual experiences are products of
an evil demon. All of these approaches have attacked the second skeptical premise that
we do not have justification to believe that we are not deceived by an evil demon or we
are not brains in vats without recourse to perceptual experiences. In this paper, I am not
concerned with these approaches. For the approaches of concern in this paper, perceptual
experiences contribute to rejection of skepticism. Let’s examine one simple such
approach: Dogmatism.
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CHAPTER 2. DOGMATISM

2.1

What is dogmatism?

Dogmatism (Huemer, 2001; Pryor, 2000) claims ipso facto justification for sensory
perceptions that means they always provide justification. According to this view, the
perceptions need not have any specific qualifications and provide justification as they are.
If I have a perceptual experience of P, then I have some justification to believe P.
The difference between the doxastic and propositional justifications is important
for correct understanding of dogmatism. Dogmatism is about propositional justification
and not doxastic justification. The question of concern is if the subject’s perceptual
experiences are a source of justification. According to dogmatism, they are. Whether the
subject’s perceptual beliefs are justified all things considered is another issue. One may
have some justification for a proposition but still reject it for other reasons.
Perceptual beliefs, according to dogmatism, are foundational because perceptual
experiences are sufficient for their justification and no other belief is necessary. I need
not believe “it seems to me as if P” and then infer P from that belief. Merely the fact that
it seems to me as if P is sufficient for giving me justification to believe P. Of course a
foundational belief formed in this way can have additional inferential justification. But
this additional justification is not necessary.
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Like many other foundational theories, dogmatism gets some support from a sort
of regress argument. The regress argument in this case says that if we require some other
meta-beliefs in order to accept justifications by perceptual experiences, then the
justification by perceptual experiences comes in part from the justification we have for
those meta-beliefs. The meta-belief can be “My sense perceptions are reliable.” But the
meta-beliefs should also be justified which requires some meta-meta-beliefs, and so forth.
Besides the regress argument, there are three other arguments in support of
dogmatism. First, both Huemer (2001) and Pryor (2000) have claimed that dogmatism is
intuitive. They claim that introspections shows us that we form perceptual beliefs solely
and immediately based on our perceptions and no other beliefs is involved in their
formation. If someone asks “why do you think there is table in front of you?” we simply
respond by citing our perceptions: “Well, I see there is one!” and consider our response
adequate. This shows, according to Huemer and Pryor, that we intuitively form beliefs
based on perceptions without any reference to any other evidence.
Second, Huemer (2013) claims that dogmatism1 is widely accepted all over
philosophy. It is the proper practice in any philosophical debate to accept and stick to
what it seems to be the case until further evidence reject it. This is in fact inherent to the
any kind of judgment, inferential or non-inferential. What dogmatism claims for
perceptions is just one instance of this generally accepted principle to stick to what seems
to be true until further evidence forces you to give it up. Huemer claims that even those
who argue against dogmatism are committed to this general practice of accepting what

1
He calls it “phenomenal conservatism”. I do not use that term to avoid confusion with
conservatism discussed in the next chapter.
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strikes them as true. If they reject dogmatism, they do so simply because this rejection
strikes them as true and they have no evidence against it. Thus, when the opponents argue
against dogmatism they are in fact arguing against the very principle they rely on and
thus, all they say is self-defeating. They are sawing off the very branch they are sitting
on.
Third, Huemer (2001) argues that it is epistemically rational to accept dogmatism.
Our epistemic goal is to generate true beliefs. Accepting what seems to us to be true
while we do not have any evidence against it, is the best we can do to serve this goal.
Therefore, it is epistemically rational to engage in this practice.
The arguments for dogmatism, Huemer believes, can be extended beyond
perceptual seemings to include also introspective, intellectual and memorial seemings.
The extended version of dogmatism states that no matter what kind of seeming I have, if
it seems to me that P is the case, then I immediately have some justification for believing
P. Further evidence, of course, may render the belief in P unjustified all things
considered. But still, the seeming provides me with some justification. For example, if I
have a memory seeming that I have had lunch and I have no reason to doubt this seeming,
then I am justified to form the belief that I have had lunch. Or if it rationally seems to me
that a certain arithmetic formula is correct, then I have some justification to believe that
formula.
By such generalization of dogmatism, Huemer (2013) attempts to develop a
unified theory for epistemology. He says:
My more recent statements leave open the possibility that PC [phenomenal
conservatism=dogmatism] enables us to surmount all epistemological problems.
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PC holds out the promise of a simple and unified account of the justification of
our beliefs about the external world, about the past, about the future, about the
values, and so on.
Before embarking on Huemer’s odyssey to solve all the problems of the future
and the past, let us examine our ship, dogmatism, against some breakers of objection.

2.2
2.2.1

Objections to dogmatism

Why do belief sources provide justification?

One important objection to dogmatism is that the view fails to explain why a belief
source, say a perceptual experience, can provide justification (Steup, 2013, 2015).
Dogmatism does not require any meta-beliefs about the belief sources. We do not have to
have the meta-belief that the belief sources can in fact provide justification. In absence of
such meta-beliefs, the belief formed based on a belief source would be accidental from
the subject’s perspective. For example, the subject does not need the meta-belief “my
perceptual experiences are reliable sources of justification for my perceptual beliefs”, and
in absence of such meta-beliefs, dogmatism offers nothing to make the perceptual beliefs
non-accidental from the subject’s perspective. To better see how those beliefs are
accidental, consider the following conversation between the subject and the adversary:
S: There is a couch in front of me.
A: How do you know that?
S: I know that because it seems to me that there is a couch in front of me.
A: Well, do you know that if it seems to you that there is an object in front of you,
then you have some justification to believe that the object is really there?
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S: No! I do not know this!
A: Then you do not know that there is a coach in front of you!
The problem is that the justificatory relation between the perceptions and the
beliefs formed based on perceptions is not clear in dogmatism. Some other criteria or
meta-beliefs should be added to dogmatism to clarify this relationship.

2.2.2

Bootstrapping

Dogmatism allows for a justified belief to be basic. A belief is basic if and only if its
justification does not even in part comes from any other justified belief. According to
theories such as dogmatism that allow basic knowledge, the subject S can repetitively use
her source of basic knowledge to form justified beliefs about the world while she does
not have evidence for the reliability of that basic source. Each time S forms a justified
belief in this way, she also acquires a piece of evidence showing that her source of basic
knowledge produces correct propositions about the world. These pieces of evidence
accumulate to eventually convince S that her source of basic knowledge is indeed,
reliable.
In the case of dogmatism, S can acquire knowledge through her perceptions while
she does not have any evidence for their reliability. Each time, however, she also acquires
a piece of evidence that her perceptions are operating reliably. At a certain point, she has
acquired enough evidence to claim her perceptions are reliable. This pernicious practice
is called bootstrapping and many philosophers agree that is illegitimate (Cohen, 2002).
One possible response refers to the maximum reliability the subject can in this
way infer for her sources of knowledge. According to this response, the evidence
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acquired by bootstrapping can actually provide some evidence for the reliability of the
source of knowledge. Nevertheless, this evidence acquired by bootstrapping cannot
increase the maximum reliability of the source from what we already had before
bootstrapping. The maximum reliability we can have is bounded with what we started
with. For example, suppose we have a measurement device which is validated with some
external standards. The validation gives the device some degree of reliability. Assuming
that the device is reliable, we use it to for our measurements. In spite of the fact that we
consider all these measurements as valid and correct, they cannot increase the reliability
of the measurement device above the degree of reliability it has obtained from validation.
This response cannot save dogmatism and the measurement device example is
misleading. According to dogmatism, evidence of reliability is not needed at all and we
can have justification based on a seeming for which we have absolutely zero evidence of
reliability. Justified beliefs formed by this source, however, provide some non-zero
degree of justification for the reliability of the source. No matter how small this
additional evidence is, it is greater than the zero evidence we started with.
One may continue the line of the above response and claim that beliefs formed by
sources for which we have zero evidence of reliability cannot provide justification for
that belief source. But claiming that the justified beliefs formed by such a source cannot
provide any justification of reliability amounts to counting those beliefs as unjustified.
Otherwise, why can they not provide justification for reliability? If dogmatism counts
those beliefs as justified, then bootstrapping is inevitable.
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2.2.3

Counterexamples from testimony

We generally do not trust testimonies before we have some evidence for their reliability.
The contents of a book, for example, do not provide us any new information unless we
have evidence that the book is reliable. The same is true about sources such as gauges
and instruments. My thermometer does not tell me the temperature unless I have some
evidence that I can trust it. In fact, painstaking efforts are made in scientific enquiries to
ensure the reliability of measurement devices before trusting their output. Any result
generated by devices and measurement procedures that are not first validated is counted
as useless and unreliable.
If we require evidence of reliability for all sources of information, it is not clear
why we should give our perceptual experiences or other seemings a higher epistemic
status and exempt them from the requirement. Our sensory organs which are the sources
of these perceptual experiences are not fundamentally different from physical sensors and
spectroscopic devices after all. Some reliability validation, therefore, is required for the
perceptions they generate.

2.2.4

Counterexamples from optical illusions

Figure 1 shows the well-known Muller-Lyer illusion. In this illusion, the top horizontal
line looks longer than the bottom one, when in fact they are of equal length. Nevertheless,
even after verifying that the two lines have equal lengths by measurement, the top one
still looks longer. The question is whether this seeming gives us any justification to
believe that the top line is longer? Dogmatism tell us that it does. For other reasons, say

11
measurements by a ruler, we are in general not justified to believe the top line is longer,
but still the seeming provides us with some justification.
It is not clear, however, why a seeming which we know is merely an illusion can
provide any justification whatsoever and the dogmatic response seems to be
counterintuitive. The dogmatist cannot say that we have some perceptual justification, but
that justification is defeated by further evidence. We are fully aware that this seeming is
not reliable and does not represent reality and hence, cannot be a source of any
justification.
An even more convincing case of optical illusion is shown in figure 2. This figure
is only a colorful painting on a piece of paper. It is obvious that nothing rotates in this
picture and everything is completely fixed. Nevertheless, we have this illusionary
seeming that the wheels are rotating. It is not clear why the seeming that the wheels rotate
can provide any justification that the wheels are actually rotating, when we are sure that
this seeming is merely an illusion.

2.2.5

Seemings with bad sources

An objection closely-related to counterexamples from optical illusion is the objection that
some seemings have bad sources. We humans often have seemings that originate from
epistemically invalid sources. For instance, some proposition may seem true to us merely
because we desire that proposition to be true. Dogmatism, however, ignores this fact and
allows the contents of any seeming to be justificatory. By not requiring any qualifications
for the seemings based on which we can form beliefs, dogmatism allows seemings with
bad sources to provide us with some justification. But contrary to what dogmatism

12
advocates, for the seemings of invalid sources suspending judgement serves the epistemic
goal of coming at truth much better than forming beliefs.
Several examples have been constructed to represent this objection. In each, the
source of the seeming is invalid in a certain way. Here I present only one of these
examples given by Markie (2013).
Imagine two prospectors, one experienced and one novice. Both of the
prospectors have found a piece of nugget which is in fact gold and to both, the nugget
they have found seems to be gold. However, the source of this same seeming is different
for the experienced and the novice. The experienced prospector possesses an extensive
experience of identifying golden nuggets and based on that experience, the nugget looks
gold to him. But the novice lacks this experience. Instead he happens to have a very
strong desire for wealth and the nuggets look like gold to him merely due to his extreme
lust for money. One may argue that in this scenario, while the seemings of the expert
confer justification on his belief that his nugget is gold because it seems gold to him, the
novice does not have justification to believe that his nugget is gold although he has the
same seeming.
Huemer (2013) defends dogmatism against such cases where seemings are caused
by unreliable mental states like desires or unjustified beliefs, by identifying three possible
scenarios. In the first scenario, the subject S is aware that her appearances come from the
source M and is also aware of the unreliability of M. Here, dogmatism tells us that S has
some justification from the appearances but also has a defeater and thus, cannot form
beliefs based on her appearances. In the second scenario, the subject S is aware that her
appearances come from source M but she is not aware that M is an unreliable source. It is
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hard to imagine such a case, but if possible, S has some justification for her belief. In the
third scenario, the subject S is not aware of the source of her appearance. Here again,
Huemer claims that the subject has some justification for her beliefs. Dogmatism is an
internalist account after all and is concerned with whether the belief is justified from the
subject’s perspective. If the subject does not know about the unreliability of the source,
then the unreliability is not related to her justification.
The above response, however, misses the point that the seemings of the novice
prospector are epistemically without value and do not have justificational force in the
first place. The effective formulation of the objection is not concerned with showing that
one of the prospectors is not justified to believe his nugget is gold. Instead, it aims at
showing that the novice prospector’s seeming is not a source of justification because it is
discredited as unreliable. There is considerable chance that our seemings come from
unreliable sources and hence, we need evidence for their reliability before the seemings
can provide us with any justification. In other words the effective formulation of the
objection targets propositional and not doxastic justification. The objection tries to show
that we cannot ipso facto trust our seemings because we often have seemings with bad
sources.

2.3

Dogmatism and Skepticism

Dogmatism rejects the second premise of the skeptical argument which states that we do
not know that we are not a brain in a vat. If the skeptic asks the dogmatist how she knows
that she is not a brain in a vat, she will respond: “I see I have hands and this perception
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ipso facto justifies me to believe that I have hands. If I have hands, then I am not a brain
in a vat.”
In this way, dogmatism rejects the skeptic’s requirement that to acquire perceptual
knowledge certain skeptical alternatives should be ruled out antecedently. We do not
need to know we are not a brain in a vat or are not deceived by an evil demon to be able
to form perceptual beliefs. We can simply ignore those alternatives since we do not have
any positive evidence for those alternatives. Until the skeptic provide use with good
evidence for the skeptical alternatives we simply ignore them.
The skeptic can argue that we already have good evidence for the skeptical
alternatives. We can think about those alternatives and observe that the world would be
mentally exactly as it is if those alternatives were the case. This, the skeptic argues, is
enough evidence to make us worry about them. But dogmatism demands more in order to
consider skeptical scenarios. Merely the idea and hypothetical possibility of such
scenarios is not enough. We should have positive tangible evidence. For example,
Huemer (2001) says he would consider being a brain in a vat if he sees a tape on his
vision reading “You are a brain in a vat!” The skeptic can hardly ever be able to bring
this type of evidence to support her scenarios.

In short, the dogmatic response to the skeptic is that I have hands, therefore I am
not a brain in a vat. This dogmatic response, however, is not adequate. The skeptical
question really asks how I can be sure that my hand perceptions are in fact due to a real
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hand; I cannot respond: because they are! It would be a clear case of question begging2.
The failure to provide an appropriate response to the skeptical argument and the
objections listed above are, in my view, enough to refute dogmatism and require more
from a source of justification. The next immediate step is conservatism.

2

Cohen (2002) nicely explains this point by an example. I am in a shop with my son to buy a red
table. I see a red table and say: “Look! Here is the red table!” But my son asks whether I am sure that the
table is really red, and it is not white but illuminated with red light. I cannot respond “I know it is really red
because it looks red to me!”

16

CHAPTER 3. CONSERVATISM

3.1

What is conservatism?

According to conservatism, perceptions are sources of justification if and only if the
subject does not have memorial data or some other evidence of their unreliability (Steup,
2004). As long as she does not have such evidence, the content of her perceptions
provides her with justification. No other prior justification or meta-belief about
perceptual experiences is needed. They are considered innocent unless proven guilty and
the subject does not have to worry if her perceptions are reliable until she acquires some
evidence indicating their unreliability. In cases in which one lacks evidence for or against
their guilt, perceptions are considered innocent. Of course perceptual justifications
acquired from these innocent sources are defeasible and the subject’s other beliefs and
perceptions may defeat them. But still, they provide some justification. Conservatism,
therefore, adds a negative condition to dogmatism. Dogmatism requires no conditions at
all and holds that seemings are a source of justification no matter what. Conservatism, on
the hand, requires that the evidence of unreliability must be absent.
Conservatism can be supported by almost all of the arguments in support of
dogmatism. For example, it finds support from the regress argument, and one can also
claim that it is intuitive and widely accepted in philosophy. Also it may be argued that it
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is epistemically rational to accept conservatism as it serves the epistemic goal of forming
true beliefs. At the same time, conservatism resists some of the objections against
dogmatism. For example, the optical illusions that are important objections to dogmatism
do not work against conservatism. In those cases we have evidence for the unreliability of
our perceptions and therefore, they do not provide justification. However, conservatisms
faces some of the same objections raised against dogmatism such as the justification
being accidental from the subject’s perspective, plus a number of other objections, as
discussed in the next section.

3.2
3.2.1

Objections to conservatism

Why do belief sources provide justification?

Conservatism is much stronger than dogmatism in explaining why a belief source
provides justification. Dogmatism has no explanation at all, but conservatism says that a
belief source can be a source of justification because we do not have evidence of its
unreliability. Nevertheless, this response is still insufficient and cannot fully explain the
justificatory power of the belief sources. Merely being aware that there is no evidence
against reliability of some belief source, does not mean that that belief source is reliable.
When one lacks positive evidence that a belief source is in fact reliable, the justification
that that belief source provides remains accidental from the subject’s perspective. This
point becomes clear in the following conversation between the subject and the adversary:
S: There is a couch in front of me.
A: How do you know that?
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S: I know that because it seems to me that there is a couch in front of me and I
have no evidence that this seeming is deceiving me.
A: Well, you have no evidence that your seeming is deceiving you, but do you
have any evidence that it is not deceiving you?
S: No! I do not have any evidence that my seeming is not deceiving me, I merely
do not have evidence that it is.
A: Therefore you cannot reject that your seeming may be deceiving you. Is that
correct?
S: It is correct! I have no reason to think that my seeming is deceiving me, but I
cannot say that it is not.
A: Therefore you do not have justification to believe there is a couch in front of
you as your seeming may be deceiving you.
The problem here is that not having evidence against reliability is different from
having evidence for reliability, and only the latter can explain why a belief source can
provide justification. Lack of evidence for unreliability does not establish a meaningful
justificatory connection between the belief source and what it justifies.

3.2.2

Bootstrapping

Similar to dogmatism, conservatism also allows basic knowledge and therefore, is open
to bootstrapping. If we do not have evidence against the reliability of a belief source and
the source, say one of our senses, provides us with some seemings, conservatism allows
forming justified beliefs based on those seemings. The justification for that belief does
not come even in part from any other beliefs and that belief is therefore, basic.
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Bootstrapping threatens theories of justification such as conservatism, that allow basic
knowledge (Cohen, 2002).
Conservatism allows forming a basic perceptual belief even in absence of positive
evidence for the reliability of perceptual experiences. The perceptual belief formed in this
way provides some justification for believing that our perceptual experiences are reliable.
These pieces of evidence for reliability accumulate and at certain point provide
justification for believing in the reliability of perceptual experiences. As explained with
more details in 2.2.2 for dogmatism, starting with zero evidence of reliability, we end up
with evidence of reliability for our perceptual experiences based on beliefs formed by the
same experiences. I am sympathetic with many philosophers who find this unacceptable
(Cohen, 2002).

3.2.3

Counterexamples from testimony

Suppose that one day on your way to work you find a book somewhere on the street. You
pick up the book out of curiosity and you find out that it reports numerous cases of
unicorn sightings. You do not have any evidence that the book is unreliable and therefore,
if you are a conservatist, you have justification to form the belief that unicorns exist3. The
story, however, does not end here. While reading the strange book, suddenly a gentleman
whom you have never met comes to you and tells you that your boss has just fired you a
minute ago and therefore, you do not need to go to work today. You do not have any
evidence that the testimony of this gentleman is unreliable and therefore, according to

3

Here, one should also ignore any background evidence one might have that reports of unicorn
sighting are generally unreliable. The possibility of such background evidence was pointed to by Professor
Rod Bertolet.
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conservatism, you have justification to accept his word. You do not need to go to work
anymore and can sit somewhere and continue reading the book and get more justification
to believe in unicorns.
The example above intends to show that mere lack of evidence against reliability
is not enough for a testimony to provide justification. We do not trust a testimony, unless
we have positive evidence of its reliability. The testimony of a book does not provide us
with justification until we have some evidence that the book is reliable. For exactly the
same reason, the words of some random person on the street do not provide us with
justification. This is exactly the reason that scientists first calibrate and validate their
experimental devices against some standards before trusting their measurements. Mere
lack of evidence that a device generates false values is not enough.

3.2.4

The problem of evidential neutrality

Cases of evidential neutrality are those cases where either we do not have evidence for or
against a belief, or our evidence for and against a belief are of equal power. In such cases,
it is rational to suspend judgment. Nevertheless, conservatism allows one to have justified
belief in such cases. Two examples by Steup (2004) described below clarify this problem
and are intended to put pressure on conservatism.
In the first example, the inhabitants of the balanced evil demon world have equal
evidence for and against the reliability of their senses. Intuitively, the inhabitants of this
world do not have justification for perceptual beliefs based on their sensory perceptions.
Nevertheless, conservatism claims, implausibly, that the inhabitants of this world have
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justification based on what seems to them to be the case according to their sensory
perceptions.
One may argue that the balanced evil demon world is not an effective scenario as
the assumption of an equilibrium point between reliability and unreliability is not a
rational assumption. Once a perceptual faculty generates false results, it loses its
reliability without passing any equilibrium point. So we have only two situations: either
we do not have evidence against reliability of a faculty, or we have evidence against its
reliability. The balanced evil demon world, therefore, may not pose a serious threat to
conservatism.
Another more compelling example of evidential neutrality is the example of the
echolocation device. Assume the faculty of echolocation is surgically implanted into the
brain of a blind subject. She is told that there is no guarantee that the faculty would work
well and there is only a fifty percent chance that it works properly. In the first experiment
after the surgery, the subject senses a table in front of her with her newly acquired faculty
of echolocation. Is she justified in believing that there is actually a table in front of her?
Conservatism implausibly says yes, she is justified. In this example, trusting the faculty
of echolocation is similar to trusting the testimony of a source without having any
evidence for its reliability.
Steup’s example of the echolocation device has very important implications.
Consider a newly born baby. The first time the baby opens his eyes, he is exactly in the
same position as the subject of the echolocation device example. The baby has a faculty,
vision, for which he has no evidence of reliability. If we accept that the subject in the
echolocation device example cannot justifiably form beliefs based on her new faculty,
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then we have to also accept that the baby cannot justifiably form beliefs based on her
vision. This is a serious problem for conservatism and opens the interesting question of
what the baby needs in order to be justified in forming beliefs based on her faculty of
vision. This observation is a good ground to move to the next theory: internalist
reliabilism. But before doing that, let us consider if conservatism can provide a
satisfactory response to the skeptical argument.

3.3

Conservatism and Skepticism

Conservatism’s response to skepticism is similar to dogmatism. According to
conservatism, our perceptual experiences provide us with justification because we do not
have evidence against their reliability. Therefore, seeing my hands, I am justified to form
the belief that I have hands. Now if I have hands, I am certainly not a brain in a vat. This
rejects the second premise of the skeptical argument, which says that I do not know that I
am not a brain in a vat and thus, prevents the skeptical conclusion.
With respect to the conservative response to skepticism, I side with many
philosophers who believe this argument is merely begging the question (Steup, 2004). If
someone asks me that how I know that I have hands if I do not know that I am not a brain
in a vat, I cannot respond that I have hands and therefore I know I am not a brain in a vat.
The response, at least from my perspective, simply begs the question.
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CHAPTER 4. INTERNALIST RELIABILISM

4.1

What is internalist reliabilism?

What do newly born babies or subjects with an experimental echolocation device lack?
Why can they not rely on their faculty of vision or echolocation to form justified beliefs?
What they lack, Steup (2004) argues, is positive evidence for the reliability of their
faculties. This evidence comes in the form of a memory data of success of the faculty.
Obviously, the subject has to also have evidence for the reliability of her memory.
According to internalist reliabilism perceptual experiences are sources of justification if
and only if the subject has undefeated evidence, in the form of memorial impression, of
the reliability of her memorial and perceptual experiences.
What motivates internalist reliabilism is its ability to explain the justificatory
power of a belief source such as our perceptual experiences. Internalist reliabilism states
that we have perceptual justifications because we have evidence that our perceptions are
reliable sources of justification. It is because of this evidence of reliability that the beliefs
justified by such sources are not accidental from the subject’s perspective. This means
internalist reliabilism has an answer for one of the most important objections against
dogmatism and conservatism. Unlike the justification by dogmatism and conservatism,
the justification by internalist reliabilism is not accidental from the subject’s perspective.
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Remember that Pryor and Huemer conclude from the fact that everyday
perceptual beliefs are formed solely based on perceptual experiences that perceptual
experiences are intuitively enough for justification. When we are asked about the reasons
we have for those beliefs, we simply cite our perceptions and do not mention any other
qualifications and conditions. Therefore, positive evidence of reliability is not needed.
Internalist reliabilism responds that in our everyday conversation the reliability
conditions are there but they are not mentioned because they are simply taken for
granted. We do not need to mention the reliability conditions because we have assumed
them. Not openly mentioning those conditions does not mean that they are not important.
Internalist reliabilism has to explain how one can establish the reliability of one’s
perceptions. For that, internalist reliabilism relies on memory impressions. We have a
long track record of our perceptions being reliable. We remember that whenever we have
identified an object in front of us, the object was actually there, and it rarely happens that
we have a sensory experience but nothing generates that perception. Also, we can
remember that different sense experiences verify one another. We remember that we can
touch an object we see in front of us and the details that our touch identifies verify the
details suggested by our vision. Even more, we have experienced that our perceptions can
be relied on to work on objects. For example, we remember that we have visually
identified two pieces of puzzles to match, and they actually matched when we put those
pieces together. Every day we deposit a rich amount of evidence for the reliability of our
perceptual faculties to our memory. This rich memory track provides ample justification
for the reliability of our faculties.
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One may object that internalist reliabilism’s method of establishing the reliability
of perceptual faculties is a clear instance of bootstrapping. We accumulate perceptual
evidence to support the reliability of perception. But internalist reliabilism has a good
response to this objection. Perception is used as a general term here and consists of a few
different faculties which provide cross evidence for each other. I can touch what I see and
hear what I touch. Therefore the evidence for the reliability of a source does not
necessarily come purely from that source.
Yes, it is true that a faculty supports itself indirectly by supporting other faculties.
Nevertheless, this indirect support should not be seen as a vicious circularity and does not
lead to bootstrapping. Rather, the evidence for reliability should be looked at as a
coherent web of memories of perceptual propositions all supporting each other. This
coherent web of memorial evidence generates a higher-order seeming in us that we can
trust our perceptions. We do not need to form the belief that our perceptions are reliable.
The seeming of reliability is enough. Internalist reliabilism merely requires the evidence
for reliability to be there in the subject’s mind. The perceptual justification does not rely
on any explicit beliefs and therefore, can be regarded as basic or foundational. Internalist
reliabilism forgoes the reliability belief in order to remain safe against Bergmann’s
objection to strong internalism (Bergmann, 2006; Steup, 2013). Bergmann’s objection
will be discussed in the following section.
A view closely related to internalist reliabilism is holistic foundationalism
suggested by Cohen (2002a)4. In this theory, the subject S first forms beliefs about the

In discussion of Cohen’s view, I use the term “Knowledge” to be consistent with Cohen’s own
language. However, this paper is concerned with justified belief and knowledge in this discussion should be
understood as justified belief.
4
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world based her sensory perceptions. These beliefs, however, are not instances of
knowledge because S has not yet established the reliability of their sources. Gradually S
acquires enough beliefs to eventually form a coherent system, in which all beliefs support
and provide grounds for each other. Once S forms this holistic system, then she is in the
position to believe that her sensory beliefs are formed by reliable sources. It is only then
that her sensory beliefs transform into knowledge.
Cohen allows unintellectual beings such as animals or children to acquire justified
belief by their sensory perceptions without forming the holistic system of beliefs. For
that, he uses Sosa’s term “animal knowledge” that is a sort of knowledge in which the
subject does not form beliefs about the reliability of the knowledge sources. Cohen
claims that animal knowledge is not closed. Also, instances of animal knowledge cannot
be combined individually for inference and therefore, bootstrapping cannot happen.
Steup’s internalist reliabilism differs here from Cohen’s holism. Steup believes
that children quickly develop the required coherent web of evidence that their perceptions
are reliable. Therefore, their justified beliefs are the same as the justified beliefs of the
grown-ups. However, justification comes in degrees. A newly-born baby has less
justification compared to her ten-year old brother although her justification is not of a
different type.

4.2
4.2.1

Objections to internalist reliabilism
The problem of vicious infinite regress

There are two versions of internalism, weak and strong. According to weak internalism,
the subject only needs to be aware of the reasons she has for her beliefs, and no meta-
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beliefs are required. Strong internalism, however, requires the subject to not only be
aware of her reasons, but also to form the meta-belief that these reasons actually support
her belief. Bergmann proposes separate objections to weak and strong internalist
positions and thus, makes a dilemma for internalism (Bergmann, 2006; Steup, 2013). The
question is whether internalist reliabilism falls victim to any of Bergmann’s objections.
Bergmann’s objection to weak internalism is that, if the subject does not have any
justified meta-belief that her reasons for a belief in fact support that belief, then the belief
formed based on those reasons would be accidental from her perspective. I have already
explained in the previous section that internalist reliabilism provides a good response
here by relating the justificatory power of a belief source to a subject’s evidence for its
reliability. I think, therefore, that the objection to weak internalism is not effective against
internalist reliabilism. Let us now look at the objection to strong reliabilism.
For a belief P to be justified based on strong internalism, we need to satisfy two
conditions: having undefeated reasons supporting P, and holding a belief that our reasons
can justify P. Bergmann points out that a belief about the justificatory power of our
reasons needs to be justified itself. This second justification should in turn satisfy the two
aforementioned conditions of strong internalism. The second condition of this second
round of justification, in turn, needs to be justified and satisfy the two conditions. This
trend results in a vicious infinite regress.
As mentioned above, internalist reliabilism forgoes requiring beliefs about the
reliability of one’s perceptions. If the subject has a long track memory of cases where
what seemed to her to be the case was actually true, then she is justified to hold beliefs
based on those seemings without forming any beliefs about their reliability. This track

28
record generates a higher level memorial seeming that the subject’s seemings are actually
reliable. The important point is that the subject need not engage in such a memory
reflection and does not form the belief that “my seemings are reliable.” Nevertheless,
deep in her mind she has such reliability data stored and this, Steup argues, is enough to
make her beliefs based on her seemings non-accidental. Formulated this way, internalist
reliabilism is not so weak to allow beliefs of the subject to be accidental from her own
perspective and also is not so strong to result in a vicious regress. It is somewhere
between the two problematic ends.
By forgoing the belief requirement, Steup provides a good answer for Bergmann’s
objection to strong internalism. But this is not the end of the story. There is another
version of this objection brought up by Huemer (2013) which aims not at belief about
reliability, but at reliability seemings or having justification for reliability. Huemer argues
that if we do not require evidence for the reliability of memories, then why should we
require such evidence for perceptions? If we do require evidence for reliability of
memories, then we should note that the reliability of any memory seeming can be
established by referring to other memory perceptions. Then, we need to go on and
establish the reliability of those reliability-generating memories by some other memories.
This line will lead to an infinite regress. For example, assume that I have memories that
my vision has never betrayed me and has been always accurate. This memory track
provides me with evidence for reliability of my vision. Now what justifies me in relying
on my memory track of accuracy of my vision? I have to refer to some other memories of
mine that my memory about vision has always been reliable. At this point one may ask
me for evidence of reliability of my memories of my memory reliability. This can go for
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ever. Huemer, therefore, suggests that at some point we need to stop asking for evidence
of reliability. He suggest that we stop asking for such evidence from the very beginning
at the level of perceptions.
Huemer’s version of the objection is also not effective. Huemer has assumed a
linear relationship between justifications and thus, has ignored an important aspect of
internalist reliabilism. Internalist reliabilism is a coherentist theory which looks at
justificatory relationships not as a line, but as a web5. Therefore, internalist reliabilism
simply replaces the infinite regress with loops and circular relations. Memories and
perceptions are all sources of justification and the subject has a track record of evidence
of their reliability in the form of a coherent web. This coherentist approach is effective
against the infinite regress. However, it generates other objections which are discussed
below.

4.2.2

The problem of circularity

Evidence for the reliability of perceptions come from memory. We remember that any
time one of our perceptual faculties presented us with a proposition, we have been able to
verify that proposition by other perceptions or by the testimony of other people. This
generates a thick coherent web of evidence in our memory that our perceptions are
reliable. But, as Huemer points out, we also need to make sure that our memory is a
reliable source of justification. How can we establish the reliability of memory? The best
we can do is to refer to memory itself and claim that we remember that our memory has

5

Coherentism used to refer to the position that only beliefs can justify beliefs (Lemos, 2007). This
is not what I mean here by coherentism. Coherentism here refers to viewing the justificatory relationships
as an interwoven web rather than connecting justifications in a straight line.
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rarely betrayed us. But using memory to show the reliability of memory results in a
source circularity with arguably unacceptable consequences. If we allow referring to a
source to show the reliability of that source, then what can prevent us from showing the
reliability of an unreliable source such as a crystal ball by referring to the crystal ball
itself?
Steup (2013) accepts that this circularity is inevitable in internalist reliabilism.
However, he believes that this source circularity is not necessarily problematic. In case of
basing the reliability of a crystal ball on the crystal ball itself, he argues that the problem
is not the circularity, but the unreliability of the crystal ball to begin with. We already
know that a crystal ball is an unreliable source. Therefore, we cannot cite its outputs to
establish its own reliability. The case is different, however, when it comes to memory
which is not generally considered to be an unreliable source.
Let’s set crystal balls aside and examine Steup’s response with a benign source of
justification. Suppose that an experimental memory chip is surgically implanted into the
brain of a subject. The subject suffers from severe Alzheimer’s and she has no reliable
memory of her own. She entirely relies on the memory chip for memory perceptions.
Unfortunately for her, the subject is told that there is no guarantee that the chip will work
properly. It may work properly and save real data, or it may fail and present her with
false memories. A few days after the surgery the subject remembers many different
things including that the chip has never presented false data to her. Can she refer to this
memory datum as evidence that the chip is in fact reliable? I believe she cannot.
This example is dangerous for internalist reliabilism. The memory of a newlyborn baby is entirely similar to the memory chip described above. The memory of a baby
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may be reliable or unreliable from her own perspective. Like the case of the memory
chip, it is hard to see how the baby can establish the reliability of her memory by
referring to her memory data. The example of the memory chip shows that if we start
with no clue about the reliability of memory, we cannot cite memory perceptions to
establish its own reliability. Accumulation of memory data also does not solve the
problem. No matter how much data the memory chip generates, it cannot establish its
own reliability all by itself. We start with zero evidence and therefore, I believe allowing
memory data with unestablished reliability to show the reliability of memory is an
instance of vicious bootstrapping and should be avoided.

4.2.3

Objections to coherentism

Internalist reliabilism is both a foundationalist and a coherentist theory. Therefore, the
question arises of what resources internalist reliabilism has to respond to standard
objections to coherentism. The first objection is isolation from reality. Coherence
happens inside the subject’s mind after all and the subject may form a completely
coherent web of beliefs that have no connection to reality. If coherence is enough, the
subject has justification to believe those propositions. I believe internalist reliabilism is
immune to this objection because of its foundational part. According to internalist
reliabilism, perceptual experiences are reliable sources of justification for their
propositional content. These perceptual experiences connect the coherent web of
internalist reliabilism to reality, therefore, the coherent web is not isolated.
The second objection says that many alternative theories can be equally coherent
and therefore, equally justified. In case of internalist reliabilism, the only alternative I can
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imagine is a skeptical scenario, say being a brain in a vat. Internalist reliabilism, however,
argues that a skeptical scenario is not as coherent as the realistic scenario. The brain in a
vat scenario is not coherent with the current technologies that do not allow brain
envatment and the fact that there are no reports of any brains in vats. This skeptical
scenario is also not coherent with the perfect continuity of our perceptions with no
blackouts and random failures. I believe similar accounts can be made for other skeptical
scenarios. One, however, needs more investigation to be able to claim that one has
exhausted all possible alternatives and has not found an equally coherent set of beliefs.
This means that the objection is valid in theory but one may hope that it would not affect
internalist reliabilism in practice.
Third, forming a coherent web of beliefs is an ongoing process. The total
coherence of a belief system gradually grows up until it reaches a point that the system
can be called coherent. But where is this point? Coherence does not have a tangible
measure and it is hard to set clear and universal criteria for identifying a set of beliefs as
coherent. This lack of clarity makes it hard to differentiate the reliable sources from the
unreliable ones. For example, it is not clear at what point a baby has acquired enough
evidence to be able to claim reliability of his perceptions and form justified perceptual
beliefs. Similarly, it is not clear why a fortuneteller cannot claim a coherent system by
citing a few cases where her crystal ball has shown her the truth. I believe that internalist
reliabilism does not have a satisfactory answer to this objection. But this is a problem for
any coherentist theory and it is not specific to internalist reliabilism.
Fourth, coherentist theories do not tell us what justifies relying on coherence as a
reliable source of justification. One may claim that it is not the coherence, but the beliefs

33
within a coherent system which confer justification, but this is not a good response. Not
any set of beliefs is coherent and this shows that coherence itself is a distinguishable
meta-property of a belief set. I think it is this property of coherence and not the beliefs in
a coherent set that confer justification. Therefore, it is legitimate to ask why coherence
can confer justification.
Some have argued that coherence itself justifies the belief that coherence is a
source of justification (Cohen, 2002). According to this view, at the beginning we do not
even know that coherent systems can reliably produce knowledge. But gradually, we
come to this understanding by accumulating a coherent set of beliefs. This response is
also not good. It is not clear which set of propositions can show the reliability of
coherence. Even if we identify such a set, how can coherence show its own reliability
when we do not know that it is a legitimate source of justification? The objection thus,
remains to be answered by all coherentist theories including internalist reliabilism.
Internalist reliabilism is an important step forward from conservatism. It solves
many problems such as the arbitrariness of justificatory relations and the problem with
closure. Nonetheless, the problem of circularity, the threat of bootstrapping and the
deficiencies inherent to coherentism cause problems for the theory. Internalist reliabilism
also faces another serious problem from indubitable perceptions which will be discussed
later in this paper (see section 5.2.1). All these show that we need to modify internalist
reliabilism. I suggest one possible modification: restricted internalist reliabilism. Before
taking this step, however, let us examine internalist reliabilism’s response to skepticism.
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4.3

Internalist reliabilism and skepticism

Internalist reliabilism explains why a belief source can provide justification for the belief
it justifies and because of this explanation, it provides a much more satisfactory response
to skepticism compared to dogmatism and conservatism. According to internalist
reliabilism, the belief source provides this justification because of the evidence for its
reliability. This explanation provides an effective response to the skeptical argument by
ruling out all the possible disguises and tricks of skeptical scenarios and hence, rejecting
the second skeptical premise. According to internalist reliabilism our perceptual
experiences are not sources of justification unless we have good evidence that we are not
victims of a skeptical scenario. This means that when we have justification by internalist
reliabilism, we have first provided a solid response to the skeptic.
This is in contrast with dogmatism and conservatism, which simply ignore the
skeptical scenarios and thus, provide nothing but question begging when their advocates
attempt to respond to the skeptic. Internalist reliabilism on the other hand, gives the
skeptical scenarios their due consideration and rejects them by appealing to evidence for
reliability. However, it is questionable whether internalist reliabilism can provide the
evidence for reliability that is needed to effectively rule out the skeptical scenarios.
Let us consider the brain in the vat scenario. If we were brains in vats, we would
have exactly the same perceptual experiences. How can internalist reliabilism provide
evidence of reliability for perceptions against this scenario? An internalist reliabilist
would argue in a coherentist way. First and most importantly, she refers to her thick
memory data of cross validated evidence of reliability for her perceptions. She has
memory data that her perceptions have not betrayed her, and she also has memory data
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that her perceptions have often been verified by other individuals. Based on this thick
memory data, it seems to her that her perceptions are reliable. She has also a memory
impression that her memory has served her well and her memory seemings are generally
reliable.
Regarding the envatment, the internalist reliabilist would say that the current
status of technology is far behind the point that makes envatment a real possibility and
there has been never any reports of brains in vats. She can validate this claim by referring
to respectable brain surgeons and neuroscientists. Therefore, she would argue that she has
coherentist evidence of reliability for her perceptions that rejects the brain in the vat
scenario.
I believe the internalist reliabilism’s response to skepticism is far better than that
of dogmatism and conservatism. Instead of begging the question, internalist reliabilism
attempts to bring a positive argument against the skeptic. However, there are important
objections to the theory which make some modifications necessary. Restricted internalist
reliabilism argues for one such modification.
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CHAPTER 5. RESTRICTED INTERNALIST RELIABILISM

5.1

What is restricted internalist reliabilism?

Internalist reliabilism requires positive evidence for reliability. Restricted internalist
reliabilism requires evidence for reliability most of the time, but not always. To qualify a
belief source for providing justification, restricted internalist reliabilism requires evidence
against the unreliability which is accessible to the subject. Lack of any accessible
alternatives, makes a belief internally indubitable from the subjects’ perspective and
evidence of reliability is not required anymore. Therefore, internalist reliabilism states:
A perceptual experience is a source of justification for S only if S has evidence
against defeaters that are accessible to S.
In this way, restricted internalist reliabilism relaxes the evidence of reliability
requirement for one type of perception: the indubitable. Restricted internalist reliabilism
is further clarified in the following sections and the reasons for this relaxation and some
specifications of dubitable and indubitable perceptions will be discussed.

5.1.1

A thought experiment: the story of a newly born baby

Let’s engage in a thought experiment and analyze the case of a newly-born baby, what
she has justification for and what she does not. For our present purpose, I assume that the
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baby starts having perceptions very soon after birth. Pre-birth perceptions can hardly
provide the baby with any evidence of reliability and thus, are irrelevant to the current
discussion. Right after birth, the baby has no evidence that her senses are working
properly. But this does not stop her from using those senses and relying on them to form
perceptual beliefs. Are these beliefs justified? From an internalist point of view, I believe
they are. A baby is not yet an intellectual being. Understanding and considering skeptical
scenarios are beyond her mental abilities. Even if someone tries to present those scenarios
to the baby, she will not understand them and she will not be able to consider them.
These perceptual experiences are the only evidence she has and therefore, internally, she
is justified to form beliefs based on her perceptual experiences. She is justified to form
those beliefs because the absence of any alternative scenario has rendered those
perceptual beliefs indubitable from the baby’s standpoint.
Let me stop here and point out how restricted internalist reliabilism is different
from conservatism. Although conservatism also allows justified perceptual beliefs for
babies, it has a different approach. Conservatism claims that even after considering the
skeptical alternative, these scenarios do not defeat one’s perceptual evidence unless she
has good evidence for those scenarios. The mere mental availability of a skeptical
possibility is not enough and positive evidence is needed e.g. in form of a tape on one’s
vision saying “you are a brain in a vat!” I do not agree with conservatism. I believe the
mere hypothetical possibility of skeptical alternatives is enough to cast doubt on our
perceptions. Once we have mental access to the skeptical possibilities, we need evidence
of reliability as internalist reliabilism requires. The reason that I allow the baby to form
justified perceptual beliefs without having evidence of reliability for her perceptions is
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that the skeptical alternatives are not available to her at her primitive stage of mental
development. If those scenarios were somehow magically available to the baby, she then
would not be justified in forming perceptual beliefs. Luckily enough, the scenarios are
not available to her.
This account is also different from internalist reliabilism. Internalist reliabilism
claims that the evidence for reliability is always needed even in the case of the baby.
According to internalist reliabilism, such evidence can be acquired quickly after birth and
the web of reliability evidence becomes coherent enough very soon. Therefore the baby’s
perceptual beliefs are justified because she has evidence for reliability. But I do not see
how a newly-born baby can start generating any justified perceptual propositions that can
then build a track record of the relevant type of memories. Internalist reliabilism seems to
go towards a dangerous bootstrapping which uses propositions generated by a belief
source for which we do not have any clue of reliability to establish the reliability of that
source itself. Also it is not clear how soon the coherent web of memorial evidence is
formed to justify baby’s perceptual beliefs.
To avoid all these problems, I suggest that the baby can acquire perceptual
knowledge without evidence of reliability. The reason the baby does not need evidence of
reliability is that unreliability is not even a hypothetical possibility for her. She does not
have even a clear understanding of the concept of reliability. Why does she need
evidence to establish a concept which she does not understand? There are many concepts
in the universe that are beyond our grasp. Is there any reason that we have to consider all
those concepts to form a simple justified belief? If we have to, we have to give up
justified beliefs altogether.
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The baby starts acquiring justified perceptual propositions without any evidence
of reliability since reliability is not yet an issue for her. But the situation changes over the
years. She eventually possesses a good deal of evidence that induce her with the seeming
that her perceptions are reliable. By the time that she is able to consider the skeptical
possibilities, she can rely on this seeming to support the reliability of her perceptions.
Cohen (2002) adopts a view which is very close to the approach I described
above, but has one important difference with it. Cohen advocates holism which is very
similar to Steup’s internalist reliabilism. Nevertheless, when it comes to babies’
perceptual knowledge he deviates from Steup’s approach. Steup believes that babies very
quickly develop a sufficiently coherent web of evidence which supports the reliability of
their perceptions. Cohen, however, allows some time before this evidential web is
formed. Until then, he believes babies have a type of knowledge which is different from
the “intellectual knowledge” the grown-up have. He uses Sosa’s term “animal
knowledge” as a label for the type of knowledge that babies and animals have and
explains that it is of a different epistemic status compared to the regular knowledge that
we, the grown-ups, possess. I, however, do not differentiate between the types of
knowledge that a baby and an adult possess. It is not true that a baby lacks a piece she
needs to form fully justified knowledge. Yes, she lacks evidence of reliability, but she
does not need that piece at all to form justified beliefs. The skeptical alternatives are not
present in her internal world and therefore, she does not need an evidence to reject them.
Thus, from the internalist perspective, the baby has all she needs and her beliefs can be
regarded as any other justified beliefs such as those of an intellectual grown-up. The gist
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of the claim is that we do not need evidence to eliminate possibilities that are completely
absent from our mental world.
5.1.2

An objection to the case of newly-born babies and its response

One may argue against restricted internalist reliabilism on the grounds that the reliability
of the baby’s perceptual experiences decreases as she grows up despite the fact that she
has acquired more and more evidence for their reliability6. For the newly born baby, the
perceptual experiences are indubitable. For adults, however, the perceptual experiences
are certainly not indubitable, although they possess far more evidence of reliability. On
the face of it, this may look counter intuitive, but I believe it is totally benign.
Suppose that you have come up with a mathematical model for an observation by
a complicated proof. The mathematical model has been successful in predicting the
results in many experiments and this has reassured you that your model is correct. One
day, however, a bright mathematician knocks on your door and suggests a theoretical
problem in your proof. Although, he cannot fully convince you, he leaves you with a
profound doubt about the theoretical grounds of your theory. At the same time that you
are pondering on the theoretical possibility of an error, your lab continues generating
results consistent with the mathematical model. After the conversation with the
mathematician, you are less certain that your model is actually correct. Yet, it does not
prevent the experimental results from providing evidence for the reliability of your
model. Every day you get more evidence of reliability for your model, but you can never
be as certain about it as you were before talking to that mathematician.

6

The objection was suggested in a conversion with Professor Paul Draper.
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The case of the newly born baby is exactly the same. Before considering the
skeptical scenarios, the perceptual experiences are indubitable from the baby’s
perspective. The baby grows up and develops mental abilities until one day, she thinks
about the skeptical scenarios. Theoretical consideration of skeptical scenarios lessens the
reliability of her perceptions and renders them dubitable. However, by then the baby has
acquired a coherent web of evidence for the reliability of her perceptions. Therefore,
although her perceptual experiences are not indubitable anymore, they are still reliable.

5.1.3

An example from ethics

It is often useful to bring examples from ethics to clarify epistemological concepts and I
think the same strategy can be helpful here. To make an ethical decision, I need to
consider all the relevant factors. I consider all the factors that I can possibly think of and
make an ethical decision. But maybe there is one other important factor, of which I could
not have any knowledge. It is simply beyond my reach. This factor, if considered, may
completely revert my ethical choice. I, unaware of that factor, go ahead and make a
decision. Can someone blame me for my decision on the ground that I did not consider
that factor? Of course not! The factor has not been accessible to me and I cannot be
blamed for not considering it.
Similarly, if I form a belief and I do not consider possible defeaters which I have
no means of being aware of, my belief cannot be marked as unjustified. The inaccessible
defeater is irrelevant to my justification for my belief and I do not need to reject it. The
belief formed without considering inaccessible defeaters is epistemically virtuous. The
case is the same for newly-born baby. As the baby has no internal access to skeptical
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alternatives, those alternatives cannot render her beliefs unjustified. She has to form
beliefs based on what is accessible to her which in her case, are perceptual experiences.

5.1.4

Two types of sources of justification: the dubitable and the indubitable

While we can readily cast theoretical doubt on almost all sensory perceptions, we can cite
some introspective and intellectual perceptions that seem to be beyond doubt. For
instance, when we feel that we are sad by introspection, it seems obvious to us that we
really feel sadness. Similarly, it is hard to see how we can doubt the intellectual
perception that x + 1 is greater than x.
Of course, indubitability of introspective and intellectual perceptions is not
universal and there are cases of incorrect intellectual and introspective beliefs7.
Nevertheless, through strict simplification and fixation in time8 we can generate
introspective and intellectual perceptions that are beyond doubt. For example, if I feel
happy, I can say without doubt that "it seems to me that I feel happy now." I add the part
"it seems to me" to be immune to psychoanalytic objections and I fix the proposition in
time to avoid relying on memory. To be further immune to possibility of misclassification
of one’s emotions, let us modify our indubitable statement to “it seems to me that I have
this feeling now” and point to the internal state instead of naming it9. To generate

7
For instance, suppose that I do a certain act for two different reasons but I am actively aware of
only one of those reasons. Someone asks me about all the reasons I have for my action. I engage in an
introspection and report the reason which I am aware of and thus, give a wrong introspective response.
Also, suppose a mathematician who has proved a certain proposition but, unbeknown to him, there is an
error in his proof. He has an intellectual perception that the proposition is proved, but in fact his perception
is wrong (Pryor, 2000).
8
I got the idea that simplification and fixation in time can generate infallible propositions through
discussions with Professor Matthias Steup.
9
The possibility of misclassification of one’s emotion was first suggested by Professor Matthias
Steup and was further underlined by Professor Paul Draper.
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indubitable intellectual perceptions I may not even need the fixation in time as many of
the intellectual concepts are timeless. For example, the proposition “something either
needs a cause for its existence, or it does not need a cause for its existence” seems to me
to be timelessly beyond doubt.
Although we can more or less easily generate indubitable introspective and
intellectual perceptions, it is hard to imagine an indubitable sensory perception except in
the cases of babies and animals as I explained above. The very moment a reflective
subject becomes aware of the skeptical scenarios, her sensory perceptions all become
dubitable. I do not agree with dogmatism and conservatism that the mere hypothetical
possibility of the skeptical scenarios is not enough to cast doubt on perceptions. I side
with internalist reliabilism that the mere hypothetical conjecture of skeptical scenarios is
enough to make perceptions dubitable and requires the reflective subject to have positive
evidence for the reliability of her sensory perceptions.
I believe what makes a proposition of any type (intellectual, introspective or
sensory) indubitable, is the absence of any legitimate alternatives even in theory. We
regard some proposition as indubitable, when no prima facie rational alternative is
internally available to us. The lack of alternatives can be due to logical absolute
elimination of all the alternatives, or the inability to entertain alternative theories. If we
have only one hypothesis, then that one hypothesis would be indubitable. Assume a
world in which only three people live. One of the three is a detective and one of them is
murdered. It is not hard to find the murderer and no further evidence is needed.
This concept can be demonstrated using epistemic probabilities. Roughly
speaking, epistemic probabilities report the certainty of a proposition from the subject’s
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perspective in terms of probabilities. It is a measure of the degree of belief that the
subject ought to have given her epistemic situation. Indubitable propositions have
epistemic probability of one. Probability of one or hundred percent certainty means that
the subject has no doubt about the proposition and is hundred percent certain from her
perspective that the proposition is true. Let us see what this probability of one means.
Assuming that epistemic probabilities roughly follow the rules of mathematical
probability, let us take recourse to the mathematical concept of probability. An “event” is
defined as a collection of a number of possible outcomes, and “sample space” is defined
as the collection of all possible outcomes. An event, therefore, is a subset of the sample
space. The probability of an event then, equals the number of outcomes associated with
that event divided by the total number of possible outcomes, i.e. the size of the event set
divided by the size of the sample space. The probability of one means that the size of
sample space equals the size of the event. The possible outcomes comprising that event
with probability of one, cover the whole sample space and there are no possible outcomes
other than what is already present in the event. In other words, there is no alternative to
an event with probability of one. Figure 2 represents this concept using a Venn diagram.
Epistemic probability of one can be defined similar to mathematical probability of
one. In this way, epistemic probability of one means that a proposition covers the whole
propositional sample space available to the subject (figure 3). There is no alternative to
that proposition from the subject’s perspective. Any proposition that exhaust all the
sample space has probability of one and thus, is certain and indubitable. It is certain that
(A&B)v(~A&B)v(A&~B)v(~A&~B) is true because it covers the whole sample space.
When I say that “something either needs a cause for its existence, or it does not need a
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cause for its existence” has epistemic probability of one, I simply report that these two
options exhaust all possible options hypothetically available to me and there are no other
alternatives. When I say that "it seems to me that I have this feeling now" has probability
of one, I imply that there is no alternative to this proposition about what it seems to me
introspectively at this time. The term “indubitable” describes this concept very well as it
implies that there is no way that one can doubt these propositions. 2+2=4. Any other
number except 4 seems arbitrary to me and I cannot imagine any legitimate alternatives.
It is not that the answer can be either 4 or 5 and I find 4 more probable. The answer can
only be 4. It is, therefore, indubitable from my perspective that 2+2=4.
For an internalist theory of justification, propositional sample space is defined as
all the propositions that are internally available to the subject. Propositions that are
beyond the reach of the subject are not part of the sample space as defined in the
internalist way. The propositional sample space of each individual therefore, is unique to
that individual and is only a subset of all the propositions that are hypothetically possible.
The epistemic probability is defined with respect to this internal sample space of each
individual. Therefore, only those propositions that are mentally accessible to that
individual are important in determining the epistemic probabilities from her perspective.
The above concept clarifies why perceptual beliefs are indubitable from the
newly-born baby’s perspective. The propositional content of perceptual experiences
cover the whole propositional sample space of a newly-born baby. When she sees a toy in
front of her, she has no epistemic option but to form the belief that the toy is in fact in
front of her. It is thus, indubitable from her perspective that the toy is there. This is not,
however, the case for her father who holds the toy in front of her. The total epistemic
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space of the father is far wider than the baby’s. He can easily imagine a skeptical
scenario, say being a brain in a vat, and the content of his perceptual experiences do not
cover his whole propositional sample space. The toy being in front of him is therefore,
dubitable from his perspective. Figure 3 shows this situation with Venn diagrams. Note
that the father’s sample sapce is not covered even by the sum of the BIV and “There is a
toy” options as he has also other alternatives which are not shown in the figure. The
larger area of “There is a toy” shows that he sees that option as more probable comapred
to the BIV scenario.
One may argue that even when the subject has no access to alternatives, those
alternatives, if any, are there. Because of the possibility of alternatives that we may not be
aware of, we can never be sure that the hypotheses we have already considered exhaust
the propositional sample space. Consequently, we can never have epistemic probability
of one10. To respond to this objection, I emphasize again the internalist perspective of
restricted internalist reliabilism. For an internalist theory of justification all that is
important is whether a belief has justification from the internal perspective of a subject.
Hence, alternative options which are internally inaccessible to the subject do not matter.
The subject may not have the mental capacity to entertain certain concepts or those
concepts may be inaccessible to him due to some external social, geographical or
historical factors. Thus, the internal propositional sample space of a subject may be much
smaller than the real sample space. Nevertheless, the internal sample space is all that
matters for an internal theory of justification.

10

This objection was suggested in a conversation with Professor Paul Draper.
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5.2

Comparison of restricted internalist reliabilism and internalist reliabilism
5.2.1

The indubitable perceptions and internalist reliabilism

The type of indubitable perceptions described above are an essential part of restricted
internalist reliabilism. However, they cause a serious problem for internalist reliabilism.
The problem is not that they are beyond doubt and the evidence for their reliability seems
redundant. A redundant additional piece of evidence does not really hurt. The problem is
that we cannot cite any memory evidence for the reliability of those utterly reliable
perceptions. This results in the conclusion that according to internalist reliabilism, our
most certain seemings cannot provide justification.
For introspective perceptions, any memory evidence we bring would be viciously
circular and rely on the very proposition in question. For example, someone asks how I
can be sure that my perception of "it seems to me that I am sad now" is a reliable
perception. I respond "because whenever it has seemed to me that I was sad at some
moment, it was actually seeming to me that I was sad at that moment." But I am just
repeating my claim and obviously, repeating a claim does not make it more justified.
It is also impossible to bring memory evidence for indubitable intellectual
propositions. Let us consider the example: “something either needs a cause for its
existence, or it does not need a cause for its existence”. Someone asks for memory
evidence supporting the reliability of this intellectual perception. I respond: “I remember
that whenever it has seemed to me that something either needed a cause for its existence,
or it did not need a cause for its existence, it has been true that something either needed a
cause for its existence, or it did not need a cause for its existence!” I am merely repeating
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my claim and it does not provide any justification for the claim. Also it is hard to see how
memory can provide any justification for the type of intellectual proposition presented in
this example. Moreover, I am supporting a timeless concept with memory by saying
“whenever …” How can a timeless intellectual concept be supported by memory which is
totally time-based?
If we accept internalist reliabilism and require memory evidence for the reliability
of indubitable perceptions, then we must give up justificatory power of the most obvious
of our perceptions because we do not have memorial evidence for their reliability.
Restricted internalist reliabilism can solve this problem by holding that if reliability of a
perception is indubitable from the subjects perceptive, she has justification based on that
perception without needing any evidence for its reliability. This allowance saves the
legitimacy of justifications provided by the indubitable perceptions for which we do not
have evidence of reliability.

5.2.2

Objections to coherentism

I discussed four problems that arise from the coherentist aspects of internalist reliabilism
in section 4.2.3. I argued that internalist reliabilism can respond to two of those four: the
problem of isolation from reality and the problem of equally coherent alternative sets.
Restricted internalist reliabilism can provide the same answers as internalist reliabilism
does to these two problems. Let us examine restricted internalist reliabilism against the
other two remaining problems which I believe internalist reliabilism cannot solve.
The first problem is the question of why we should trust coherence as a source of
justification. If coherence is what establishes the reliability of all sources within the
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coherent system, what can then establish the reliability of coherence itself? Fully
coherentist approaches have no choice but to claim that it is the coherence that establishes
its own reliability. I argued before that this is not a plausible response. Restricted
internalist reliabilism, however, may provide a foundationalist response to this question.
One may claim that we the human beings have an indubitable intellectual perception that
a coherent set of propositions can be a reliable source of justification. If someone has
such an indubitable perception, then she can go on and rely on coherence.
It may be argued that doubt about coherence is accessible to us and therefore, the
justificatory power of coherence is dubitable. I disagree that this doubt is immediately
accessible. However, we should investigate the matter deeper. Note that the claim in
question is not that any coherent set is justified. Rather, the claim is that the fact that
coherence provides some justification may be considered as indubitable.
Let us examine an example which suggests indubitable justification for
coherence. Suppose that we have two sets of beliefs which have corresponding elements
that are equally justified if compared one by one to each other all by themselves. One of
these sets, however, is coherent and the other set is not. One can argue that it is
completely obvious and therefore, indubitable that the elements of the coherent set have
more justification due to their coherence compared to the elements of the other set.
However, even if someone is sympathetic to the obviousness of this observation, she
cannot necessarily conclude that the justificatory power of coherence is indubitable. To
establish indubitablity of justification for coherence, one needs to show that it is the only
legitimate alternative. If any other alternatives are possible, no matter how improbable
they are, we cannot claim that coherence provides justification indubitably.
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Moreover, a counterexample can be constructed against the indubitablity of
justification by coherence. Suppose the same two sets as described in the previous
example, but this time assume that all elements of both of the sets are completely
unjustified. If one knows this fact, can she claim that the coherent set is somewhat more
justified? Can coherence of knowingly unjustified propositions provide any justification?
I believe that both of the sets in this example have zero justification and coherence cannot
provide any justification. It is hard therefore to show that the justificatory power of
coherence is indubitable.
The second problem is the ambiguity of the coherence threshold needed for
justification. Once we understand why we can trust a coherent set, we should ask when a
set of propositions can be considered as coherent. At this time, I do not have an idea how
restricted internalist reliabilism can solve this problem. I find no legitimate indubitable
perception that can help us out. Nevertheless, the problems of the justificatory power of
coherence and the ambiguity of the coherence threshold are shared by all coherentist
theories and do not arise specifically from restricted internalist reliabilism. Internalist
reliabilism for example, faces the same problems. Restricted internalist reliabilism solves
some of the problems of internalist reliabilism, but not all of them.

5.2.3

The problem of circularity

I discussed how circularity is a problem for internalist reliabilism. I used the example of
the implanted memory chip to show the implausibility of establishing the reliability of
memory by relying on memory perceptions (see 4.2.2). Relying on memory to show its
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own reliability results in an unacceptable source circularity in internalist reliabilism.
Here, I analyze restricted internalist reliabilism against this problem.
Not all of our memory perceptions are the same. They come in a spectrum. On
one end of the spectrum are the memory perceptions which are vague, weak and doubtful.
I have, for example, some vague idea of how my mom’s grandfather used to look. On the
other end of the spectrum stand some other memory perceptions which are clear, definite
and beyond doubt. For example I have no doubt that my name is Hamed. In the middle
we have memory perceptions with wide range of varying uncertainties. We have all
experienced this range of uncertainty while taking exams. We quickly remember some
responses, have doubts about some and do not remember some other at all.
Memory impressions which are weak and vague are in fact not reliable.
Therefore, I do not see why we should seek evidence for their reliability and try to prove
for them a quality which they do not have. On the other hand, the relative reliability of
strong memory impressions and what is in the middle can be shown by referring to other
memories because we have justification for the general reliability of memory. To
establish the general reliability of memory, restricted internalist reliabilism may suggest
that the memory impression that memory is generally reliable is indubitable and thus, one
does not need evidence for its reliability. Once one accepts this meta-memorial
perception as indubitable, then she can justify other memories by memories. However, it
may be obvious that memory has generally served us well, but it does not mean that it is
necessarily indubitable.
Restricted internalist reliabilism may not be able to fully solve the problem of this
circularity. Nonetheless, it provides better answers compared to internalist reliabilism
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especially in case of baby’s perceptual beliefs. To see this superiority, let’s re-examine
the example of the memory chip, this time against restricted internalist reliabilism. The
subject, who has no memory of her own, is told that the memory chip installed in her
brain may or may not be reliable. Now, after the surgery, the patient has a memory
perception generated by the chip. Even if this memory perception is strong and clear, the
subject can easily doubt it due to her prior knowledge that the memory chip may be
unreliable. Those memory perceptions are therefore, dubitable. As the subject lacks
evidence for the reliability of those dubitable memory perceptions, she cannot rely on
them. So the theory gives us the intuitively correct response. Up to this point, restricted
internalist reliabilism is not significantly different from internalist reliabilism. Internalist
reliabilism requires evidence for reliability in all cases and as the subject does not have
evidence for reliability of the memory chip, she cannot form beliefs based on the memory
impressions it generates.
In my previous analysis of this example, I said that according to internalist
reliabilism the newly-born baby is in the same position as the subject of the memory chip
surgery. The baby has just started using her memory and does not have evidence for its
reliability. Therefore, the baby can also not rely on her memory. Note that internalist
reliabilism depends on reliability of memory impressions for its evidence of reliability for
perceptual experiences. If the baby does not have reliable memories, she also does not
have reliable perceptual experiences. The problem of reliability propagates.
However, while the baby and the subject of the surgery are the same from the
internalist relibilism’s perspective, they are different from the restricted internalist
reliabilism’s point of view. Unlike the subject of the surgery, a baby has not yet
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developed the intellectual capacities to consider the possibility of the unreliability of her
memories. Therefore, strong memorial perceptions are indubitable from her perspective
and she can use them to generate justified beliefs. The theoretical possibility of
unreliability, however, is available to the subject of surgery. Therefore, the memory chip
seemings are dubitable from her perspective and, unlike the baby, she needs evidence of
reliability. Restricted internalist reliabilism thus, produces the intuitive response and
separates the case of the baby from the case of the subject of surgery.

5.3

Restricted internalist reliabilism and skepticism

The simple concise version of the skeptical argument goes as follows:
1- J(hands)  J(~BIV)
2- ~J(~BIV)
3- ~J(hands)
If I have justification that I have hands, then I have justification that I am not a brain in a
vat (BIV). But I do not have justification that I am not a brain in a vat and by modus
tollens, I do not have justification that I have hands.
Dogmatism, conservatism and internalist reliabilism all reject the second premise
of this argument that we do not have justification that we are not BIV. Dogmatism claims
that our perceptual experiences provide us with justification that we have hands and this
is enough to have justification that we are not BIV. Conservatism, claims that our
perceptual experiences provide us with justification that we have hands until we have
evidence that they do not. If we have justification that we have hands, we have
justification that we are not BIV. Internalist reliabilism has a different strategy and
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requires positive evidence in the form of memory seemings that our perceptual
experiences are reliable. This positive evidence of reliability provides us with
justification that we are not BIV. All of the three theories, therefore, attack the second
premise. Restricted internalist reliabilism, however, has more in its arsenal.
For the dubitable sources of justification, restricted internalist reliabilism rejects
the skeptical argument in the same ways as internalist reliabilism. Like its predecessor,
restricted internalist reliabilism requires positive evidence of the reliability for the
dubitable sources in the form of memory perceptions of reliability as discussed above.
Part of this evidence is having justification that one is not a BIV. In other words, our
dubitable perceptual experiences provide us with justification only if we have some
evidence against the skeptical alternatives.
The case, however, is more complicated for the indubitable belief sources for
which, restricted internalist reliabilism does not require evidence for reliability. I
previously argued that not only requiring evidence of reliability for indubitable sources is
redundant, but also it leads to absurdities in some cases.
To clarify how the indubitable belief sources are immune to the skeptical
argument even in absence of evidence for their reliability, we need an expanded version
of the skeptical argument as follows:
1- [J(hands) & J(hands~BIV)]  J(~BIV)
2- ~J(~BIV)
3- ~[J(hands) & J(hands~BIV)]
4- J(hands~BIV)
5- ~J(hands)
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The first premise of this expanded version is the closure principle and states that if
I have justification that I have hands and I also have justification that having hands
entails not being a BIV, then I have justification that I am not a BIV. Although some
have argued against closure (Dretske, 2005), it is generally regarded as an
unobjectionable principle (Cohen, 2002; Hawthorne, 2005).
The rest of the argument is based on the first premise. Given the closure principle,
if one does not have justification for not being a BIV, then one has to accept that one
does not have justification for having hands. In the case of the indubitable perceptions,
we do not have positive evidence of reliability and therefore, we cannot claim that we
have justification for not being a BIV. The only option seems to be rejection of the
closure principle.
Restricted internalist reliabilism, however, does not reject the closure principle.
Instead, the theory claims that J(hands  ~BIV) and ~J(~BIV) are irrelevant to subject’s
justification because of their internal inaccessibility for the subject and their complete
absence from the subject’s internal perspective. For example, in the case of the newlyborn baby, the baby has justification for having hands by her indubitable perceptions.
These perceptions, however, do not provide the baby with justification that she is not a
BIV because she does have any idea what a BIV is. BIVs are totally absent from her
mental world. Not being a BIV thus, is not associated with and is not entailed by having
hands from the baby’s perspective and therefore, J(hands  ~BIV) and ~J(~BIV) are
meaningless statements and irrelevant to her justification. If these statements are
irrelevant to baby’s justification, then the skeptical argument does not work against her.
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In this way, for indubitable perceptions restricted internalist reliabilism accepts the
closure principle but rejects the skeptical argument formed based on this principle.
Transposing the above argument to the concise three step version of the skeptical
argument, we should say that restricted internalist reliabilism rejects the first premise of
the skeptical argument for indubitable perceptions. We saw before that restricted
internalist reliabilism rejects the second premise in the dubitable cases. Therefore in
summary, restricted internalist reliabilism has two responses for the skeptic. In case of
the indubitable belief sources, the theory argues that the skeptical alternatives are
irrelevant and can be ignored and thus, the first premise of the skeptical argument does
not hold. In the case of the dubitable belief sources, the second premise of the skeptical
argument is rejected by positive evidence for reliability similar to internalist reliabilism.
Using two different strategies, restricted internalist reliabilism provides a much stronger
response to the skeptical argument, compared to dogmatism, conservatism and internalist
reliabilism. The theory can reject both the first and the second premise of the skeptical
argument.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, I analyzed three internalist accounts of justified perceptual beliefs:
dogmatism, conservatism and internalist reliabilism. Analyzing the objections to each
account, I showed how one should move from dogmatism to conservatism to internalist
reliabilism. Then I showed that we also need to move from internalist reliabilism and as
the next step, I suggested an alternative account: restricted internalist reliabilism.
Restricted internalist reliabilism differentiates between dubitable and indubitable
perceptions and requires evidence of reliability for the former but not the latter. I showed
how restricted internalist reliabilism can solve some important problems of internalist
reliabilism such as justified perceptual beliefs of babies, lack of memorial reliability
evidence for indubitable belief sources and some cases of the circularity problem. I also
argued that restricted internalist reliabilism can provide a much more satisfactory
response to the skeptic compared to all other alternatives discussed.
Although restricted internalist reliabilism solves some of the problems of
internalist reliabilism, it cannot solve them all. Some of the objections to internalist
reliabilism, for instance some objections to the coherentist nature of the theory, retain
their force against restricted internalist reliabilism. Nonetheless, restricted internalist
reliabilism is immune to many of the problems of previous theories and, as far as I know,
does not bring new problems with it. Thus, it is a step forward.
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Figure 1: Muller-Lyer Illusion
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Figure 2: an optical illusion.
Everything is stationary in this picture
and nothing rotates. (by Akiyoshi
Kitaoka)
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A

Sample Space

Event

B

Sample Space

Event

Figure 3: A) An event with probability of less than
one, B) An event with probability of one. The area
associated with the event covers the whole sample space
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A Propositional sample Space B Propositional sample Space

There is a toy

There is
a toy

I am
BIV

Figure 4: A) The propositional sample space of the baby
is covered by the propositional content of her perceptual
experience. B) The father has more propositional options and
therefore, his propositional sample space is not covered by the
propositional content of his perceptual experience.
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